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GADE v. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION:
REALITY CHECK ON THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
In the United States, federal and state laws regulate the hazardous
waste industry. At the federal level, labor and public health legislation
merge in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act or
Act).1 The stated purpose of the Act includes ensuring "so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions."2 Before Congress passed the OSH Act, states had regulated
industrial safety for almost a century through their traditional police pow-
ers.3 In fact, when Congress enacted federal legislation, most states had
in place their own industrial safety programs.4 States often passed such
legislation in response to specific industrial accidents and restricted the
laws to certain industries or classes of workers.5 As a result, programs
varied widely among states and none was as comprehensive, standard-
ized, or contained the range of enforcement procedures as the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act.6 The interference with state au-
thority by new federal guidelines created a conflict between state and
federal authority that would ultimately be resolved according to the prin-
ciples of preemption.7
The OSH Act's design and method of implementation encourage the
federal government to work with the states to regulate employee occupa-
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (finding regulation necessary to alleviate
health problems associated with the workplace).
2. Id. at § 651(b).
3. See BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 1 (1984) (noting
that most states provided workers compensation by 1921).
4. See GARY Z. NOTHsTEIN, THE LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 60
(1981).
5. See MirNz, supra note 3.
6. Id.; see Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1452 (1984) (noting that the differences among and short-
comings of state laws prompted Congress to initiate federal involvement in industrial
safety regulation).
7. NOm-STEIN, supra note 4 at 60-61. Under the doctrine of federal supremacy, the
OSH Act temporarily preempted all state occupational health and safety programs, except
those covering areas not addressed by federal OSHA standards. Id.
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tional health and safety.8 Section 18 of the Act9 provides a mechanism
for states to gain federal approval to retake jurisdiction of health and
safety programs and enforce standards under their own plans.10 Cur-
rently, twenty-three states and territories regulate industrial safety mat-
ters under approved plans." Seven states have withdrawn their own
federally approved plans and follow the OSH Act.' 2
Section 18(b) of the OSH Act allows a state to assume jurisdiction over
occupational state health and safety matters addressed by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after federal approval
of the state's regulatory plan.'3 Although Illinois lacked a federally ap-
proved plan,' 4 in 1988 the Illinois legislature passed two laws requiring
licensing of laborers who work with hazardous wastes.' 5 The Illinois laws
spoke to several regulatory subjects for which OSHA had developed but
8. See generally Barbara J. Fick, Symposium Health in the Workplace: Forward, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 807 (1987) (arguing that the OSH Act may have delayed imple-
mentation of federal health and safety standards to "prod the states to develop their own
standards").
9. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988). The Act allows states to decide whether to seek control
of occupational safety and health matters, but offers incentives such as federal grants to
encourage states to assume jurisdiction through the approval process. The Secretary of
Labor, as head of OSHA, approves submitted state programs. Id. § 667(c).
11. Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See
29 C.F.R. § 1952 (1992).
12. WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. & DONALD R. CROWELL, II, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT § 1.04[7] n.59 (1991). The seven include
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. Id. The
states' withdrawal of these plans resulted from either political pressure or failure of the
state legislature to enact enabling legislation. Id. § 1.04[7]. Connecticut and New York
now have plans that cover only public employees. Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) provides:
Any State which, at any time desires to assume responsibility for development
and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard
has been promulgated ... shall submit a State plan for the development of such
standards and their enforcement.
14. Shortly after Congress enacted the OSH Act, Illinois submitted a plan that was
initially approved, but Illinois withdrew its plan on June 30, 1975 before the Secretary of
Labor granted final approval. 40 FED. REG. 24,523 (1975).
15. Hazardous Waste Equipment Operators and Laborers Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
225, para. 220(1)-(17) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7701-17
(1991)) and Hazardous Waste Laborers Licensing Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para.
221(1)-(15) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7801-15 (1991)).
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not finalized standards.' 6 The state laws required certification of at least
forty hours of training in an approved program,' 7 passage of a written
exam,' 8 and completion of an annual refresher course to renew the one-
year license. 9 The law also mandated hazardous waste crane operators
to submit a certified record evidencing their operation for at least 4,000
hours of equipment used to handle toxic waste.20
The hazardous waste removal industry would bear the educational and
administrative costs of complying with the state regulations. Conse-
quently, the National Solid Wastes Management Association
(NSWMA)21 filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the director
of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), the designated
enforcer of the Illinois provisions, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
licensing laws a short time before their effective date.22
NSWMA challenged the requirement that training be conducted within
the state, which favored Illinois residents over out-of-state workers, as a
violation of the Commerce Clause.23 The district court invalidated the
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (1992) (setting forth the federal standards which became ef-
fective March 6, 1990). The standards detail requirements for training and certification of
workers at hazardous waste sites. Id. § 1910.120(e). The federal guidelines provide for a
minimum of 40 hours of instruction and three days of actual field experience. Id.
§ 1910.120(e)(3)(i). Management or supervisory personnel must log at least eight addi-
tional hours of training. Id. § 1910.120 (e)(4). Documented work experience may substi-
tute for the 40 hour requirement, but experienced workers must nevertheless receive site-
specific training and supervised field experience. Id. § 1910.120(e)(9). The goal of the
federal standards is "to provide employees with the knowledge and skills necessary to per-
form hazardous waste clean-up operations with minimal risk to their safety and health." 54
FED. REG. 9294, 9304 (1989).
The Illinois regulations did not cover all areas reached by federal standards. For exam-
ple, the Illinois laws provided no special training requirements for emergency cleanup
workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(d)(4); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(e)(7) (setting forth train-
ing requirements for emergency response personnel).
17. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, paras. 220(5)(c) and 220(6)(c) and 221(5)(c). As origi-
nally enacted, the law mandated that such training occur within Illinois. Id.
18. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 225, paras. 220(5)(e), 220(6)(d), and 225(5)(d) (Smith-Hurd
1993) (formerly ch. 111, paras. 7705(e), 7706(d), and 7805(d)).
19. Id. paras. 220(7) and 225(6) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly 7707(b) and 7806(b).
20. Id. para. 220(5)(d) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (formerly 7705(d)).
21. NSWMA is a trade association with membership consisting of businesses across
the United States engaged in removal, transportation, and disposal of waste material, in-
cluding but not limited to, hazardous waste. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
v. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1989).
22. When the suit was filed, Bernard Killian was the director of the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Mr. Killian was succeeded by Mary Gade and she was substi-
tuted for Killian as a party to this action. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2377, 2380-81 (1992).
23. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438, at *7; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
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provision for in-state training, finding that exclusive training require-
ments in no way contributed to the stated purpose of the law, namely to
protect the public as well as worker safety and the environment.24 The
state did not appeal that part of the decision, but the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit opined:
It seems likely to us, in any event, that the "within Illinois" pro-
vision could not have survived NSWMA's commerce clause
challenge, since the provision would have imposed a substantial
burden on out-of-state workers and companies while making no
discernible contribution to public safety.
25
Thus, the Commerce Clause challenge dropped out of the case at the dis-
trict court level and NSWMA's remaining contentions were resolved
under preemption analysis.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order on August 17, 1989.26 The
court examined the issue as involving the scope of the OSH Act's reach
into the areas Illinois sought to regulate.27 The court adopted a test used
by the Second Circuit to decide another OSH Act preemption case.28
Under this "independent basis" test, the OSH Act does not preempt a
state law that serves a "legitimate and substantial" purpose other than the
one furthered by the federal law.29 Applying that standard, the district
court first found that the stated purposes of the Illinois laws, promoting
public safety and environmental protection, were legitimate goals in-
dependent of the federal goal of promoting job safety." The court, how-
ever, invalidated the state law's requirement that training be conducted
within Illinois because it found no evidence that the provision promoted
the state's goals.3 ' Nonetheless, the district court went on to rule that the
offending provisions could be severed from the legitimate portions of the
("The Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
24. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96483, at *5.
25. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 676 n.3 (7th Cir.
1990).
26. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438, at *1. Jurisdiction over the case was
gained under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201 (1991). Id. at *3.
27. Id. at *4.
28. The Second Circuit developed this test in Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v.
City of New York, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
29. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438, at *4-5.
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id. The court struck the words "within Illinois" from the Illinois laws' training
provisions. Id. at *8.
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laws, allowing portions not preempted by the OSH Act to remain in ef-
fect.32 The court then explicitly found that the OSH Act did not preempt
the Illinois statute provisions requiring a certified record of 4,000 hours of
equipment operation.33
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court and concluded that OSHA's final rule preempted Illinois'
4,000-hour experience requirement.34 Writing for the appellate court,
Judge Cudahy stated the standard applied: "[slection 18 is clear: where
OSHA has properly established a standard, a state may not create a stan-
dard of its own on the same topic unless the state acts pursuant to a plan
approved by the Secretary of Labor.' '35 However, the Seventh Circuit
also refused to invalidate the entire challenged legislation.36 Instead, the
court remanded the case to the district court, reasoning that many of the
state law provisions were impossible to evaluate in the absence of final
implementing regulations.37 On remand, the district court presumably
would evaluate the final state regulations in light of the standard laid out
in the appellate court's opinion. 38 However, Illinois appealed the deci-
sion and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.39
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on Gade v. Na-
32. Id. at *8.
33. Id.
34. Killian, 918 F.2d at 684.
35. Id. at 684.
36. Id.
37. Id. Judge Cudahy cited the lack of descriptions of the exact content of the training
courses and the examinations to be given as examples of missing information. Id. In light
of the standard applied to strike down the 4,000-hour requirement, this focus on the con-
tent, rather than the mere existence, of state regulation is perplexing. By pausing to con-
sider the content of the Illinois program, Judge Cudahy effectively suggested that a state
possibly may act in situations where a federal OSHA standard exists. Such a possibility
contradicts his announced test for unapproved state action, given that federal standards
exist in the same areas as the Illinois law.
38. Id. The court of appeals confirmed the district court's dismissal of NSWMA's
Commerce Clause challenge, which NSWMA had not appealed. The court of appeals also
expressed some concern about the "potential burden on interstate commerce suggested by
the exemption of certain classes of employees" in the Illinois laws. Id. at 684-85. The court
noted that "such exemptions may suggest an intent by a state to discriminate against inter-
state commerce" and encouraged the district court on remand to examine the effects of
those exemptions to determine whether they impermissibly favored Illinois residents and
companies over those outside the state. Id.
Judge Easterbrook filed a separate opinion expressing some doubt about section 18's
preemption power. Id. at 685. His opinion included a practical approach to this case as
well as some criticism of the legal analysis employed by his colleagues. See id. Judge Eas-
terbrook's analysis serves as part of the foundation of the final section of this Note.
39. 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
1994]
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tional Solid Wastes Management Ass'n' on March 23, 1992. In a five-to-
four decision,41 the Court found that Illinois' licensing acts governing
hazardous waste workers were completely preempted by the federal
OSHA standards and therefore invalid. Writing for a plurality, Justice
O'Connor relied on the doctrine of implied preemption and constructed
congressional intent to strike down the state laws.4 2 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Kennedy went a step further and declared that section
18 of the OSH Act expressly preempts all state-imposed standards re-
lated to occupational health and safety in any situation in which a federal
standard exists. 43 Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which he
argued that the existence of federal standards does not necessarily pre-
empt all state regulation in an area.44
The Gade decision balanced two legitimate interests: the state's inter-
est in protecting public health and worker safety and the industry's inter-
est in providing cost efficient toxic material operations. Because
hazardous waste is a serious present and future health issue, the methods
employed to dispose of hazardous materials are critical. Therefore, the
balance struck in Gade has significant social implications. The dangers
associated with toxic waste most directly impact the workers who handle
the material; however, the general public and the environment also bear
the risk of exposure to toxic wastes during transportation and disposal
procedures. To minimize potential harmful effects of hazardous materials
on the planet and on the health of future generations of her inhabitants,
the federal government should seek to encourage handling and disposal
of dangerous materials in as safe and effective a manner as current tech-
nology will permit.
This Note discusses the analysis used in Gade to determine whether a
state without an approved plan under section 18 of the OSH Act may
selectively supplement federal standards for occupational health and
safety to benefit the public and the environment. Part I reviews the pre-
emption doctrine and its application in situations similar to that in Gade.
40. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992), affg National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian,
918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1991), vacating National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian,
No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL 96438 (N.D. I11. Aug. 17, 1989).
41. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White,
announced the judgment of the Court. Justice Kennedy, joining in all but part I of Justice
O'Connor's opinion, wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Souter filed a dissenting
opinion which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas joined.
42. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
43. Id. at 2390.
44. Id. at 2391-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The second and third sections discuss the plurality and dissenting opin-
ions in Gade. Finally, Part IV examines the practical effects of the deci-
sion and the current state of the law in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Gade. Because Gade was the Court's first preemption case
involving the OSH Act, this Note concludes that the decision marks an
important resolution to the questions concerning shared authority be-
tween the state and federal governments raised by the passage of the Act.
In analyzing Gade, this Note looks beyond interpreting the language of
the Act and examines the case in the context of similar preemption cases
and practical experience to determine the relative wisdom or folly of the
decision. As in most areas of law, the conflict between legitimate inter-
ests makes accommodation among them necessary; the ultimate question
to ask and answer is how the Supreme Court's accommodation in Gade
will serve society.
I. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION
A. Preemption Basics and "Dual Impact" Laws
The preemption doctrine is a constitutional principle that says that
Congress may regulate an area within its power to the exclusion of state
regulation, displacing state involvement without further inquiry. The
doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United
States Constitution.45 Courts find express preemption when Congress
specifically includes in a federal law a provision stating that the federal
law is to displace any existing state laws.46 Under implied preemption
analysis, if a court finds that a state law blocks the specific goals of federal
legislation, the federal law preempts the state law.4 7 That the state tradi-
tionally has had authority to regulate the subject matter is irrelevant if
the state's law "interferes with or is contrary to" some federal law.48 Im-
45. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
46. E.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)
("[t]he provisions of this title shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ); Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 (1988) ("The regulation.., shall preempt any provision ... by any
state ... ").
47. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526-43 (1977) (finding that Califor-
nia's weight-labeling law interfered with the congressional purpose to facilitate compari-
sons among products).
48. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (holding that Treasury Regula-
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plied preemption requires a challenged state law to yield to a federal law
in two situations. First, a court will find preemption if actual and irrecon-
cilable conflict between federal and state statutes renders compliance
with both physically impossible, or if the state standard blocks the federal
goals.49 Second, state law must give way when a federal law serving a
dominant federal purpose occupies a particular field with a pervasive
scheme of regulation."
Preemption cases often involve a collision between a federal standard
and the police power traditionally retained by states, including the state
power to regulate public health and safety. By applying mandatory
OSHA health and safety standards to all businesses engaged in interstate
commerce,51 Congress has invaded regulatory areas traditionally man-
aged by individual states.
Moreover, few laws, state or federal, are designed to serve a single pur-
pose. Hence, another common issue in preemption cases is whether state
laws which purport to serve multiple purposes (called "dual impact"
laws) actually serve those purposes or whether the laws are only phrased
in broad terms to evade preemption by federal law. Some of the things a
"dual impact" law might seek to protect are the environment, the public
at large, and workers. This was the situation in Gade.
B. Preemption Precedent
Courts have applied preemption analysis in many cases before Gade.
Indeed, those cases form a backdrop for examination of the legal devel-
opment taken in Gade. In particular, several other cases have addressed
OSHA's preemptive power. In Associated Industries v. Snow,52 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that OSHA standards did not
preempt Massachusetts' asbestos abatement regulations that were more
stringent than the federal standards and, as in Gade, not part of an ap-
tions placing a right of survivorship on U.S. savings bonds prevailed over conflicting Texas
law deeming the bonds community property).
49. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (upholding a Cali-
fornia statute that on its face did not conflict with the Sherman Act); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (finding a state statute valid
where collision with federal standard was not inevitable); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941) (holding that a Pennsylvania law requiring annual registration of aliens did not
block federal control of immigration).
50. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(finding that the federal government's total regulation of savings and loan institutions im-
pliedly preempted state regulation).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
52. 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
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proved plan. 3 The court in Snow specifically held that the state intended
the training and licensing regulations to protect the public, at least indi-
rectly, and, because OSHA standards protect only workers, OSHA had
no power to preempt laws other than job safety measures. 54 The court
did find preemption of two measures related to respirator and medical
monitoring requirements, because the regulation served to protect only
the health of individual asbestos workers.5
In Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York,56 which
involved the asbestos removal industry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit invalidated regulations passed by the City of New York
mandating training and certification of workers handling asbestos.5 ' The
court found preempted only those state regulations that purported to
protect occupational health and safety.58 The Second Circuit acknowl-
edged that section 18 of the OSH Act preempted only occupational
health and safety standards.5 9 Because the local laws had dual purposes
of protecting worker and public health, however, the court found that, to
avoid invalidation by express preemption, the city would have to be able
to demonstrate "a legitimate and substantial" purpose (not effect) for the
regulations.' Employing implied preemption analysis, the court refused
to accept either the notion that Congress intended in the OSH Act to
occupy the entire field of asbestos worker training or that the City's pro-
gram actually conflicted with the goals of the OSH Act.6 1 The court con-
cluded that states remained free to regulate in areas where no federal
guidelines existed or where the state law served a significant purpose
apart from protecting worker health and safety.62
Outside the hazardous materials arena, a third case is California Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra.63 In Guerra, the Supreme Court
ruled that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Preg-
nancy Disability Act ("PDA"), did not preempt a state law requiring em-
ployers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees with pregnancy-
53. Id. at 283-84.
54. Id. at 280.
55. Id. at 284.
56. 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 60.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 57.
60. Id. at 55-57.
61. Id. at 59.
62. Id. at 60.
63. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
1994]
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related disabilities. 6" The Court reasoned in Guerra that the goals of the
state and federal statutes were consistent and that compliance with both
was possible.65 Writing in concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that section
708 of Title VII prohibited preemption except where state law mandated
unlawful conduct under the PDA; because California's law did not do so,
it was not preempted.6
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GADE
A. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion
The Supreme Court ostensibly granted certiorari in Gade to outline the
preemptive effect of OSHA on state "dual impact" statutes.67 A plurality
of the justices construed section 18(b) narrowly and concluded that states
may regulate matters for which a federal OSHA standard exists only
upon receiving the approval of the Secretary of Labor.68 Without ruling
definitively, Justice O'Connor proclaimed the OSH Act's strong preemp-
tive power over the states and doomed the Illinois laws challenged in
Gade.
1. Section 18(b) Interpretation
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion focused on two issues: (1) section
18(b)'s role within the overall framework of section 18; and (2) the effect
of section 18(b) on dual impact state laws not approved as required under
the OSH Act.6 9 With respect to the first issue, Illinois had argued (along
the lines of Judge Easterbrook's opinion in the court of appeals) that the
existence of provisions allowing states to retake complete responsibility
64. Id. at 292.
65. Id. at 288-92. The Court relied on the fact that Congress knew when it enacted the
PDA that some state regulations overlapped with the federal scheme "but did not indicate
that [the state laws] would be pre-empted by federal law." Id. at 291 n.30.
66. Id. at 295-96.
67. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2381.
68. Id. at 2383 ("[Tlhe only way a State may regulate an OSHA-regulated occupa-
tional safety and health issue is pursuant to an approved state plan that displaces federal
standards."). The Secretary of Labor is the head of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(c) (1993).
69. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386-88. Section 18(b) of the OSH Act provides:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development
and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard
has been promulgated ... shall submit a State plan for the development of such
standards and their enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988).
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for job health and safety regulation implied that states need only under-
take the expensive and time consuming process of gaining federal ap-
proval if occupational safety was the state's goal.70 Instead, IEPA
claimed, the OSH Act did not forbid a state's regulating on a piecemeal
basis and surpassing federal standards without federal approval.
The plurality soundly rejected IEPA's argument by reading section
18(b) together with other parts of section 18.71 The Court found that
IEPA's theory would render section 18(a)72 "superfluous" and would
"undercut" section 18(c).7 3 In addition, the plurality pointed out the in-
consistency between IEPA's theory and section 18(0's provisions for allo-
cation of jurisdiction between a state and the federal government in the
event the Secretary of Labor withdrew approval of the state's program.74
Concluding its analysis of the context of section 18(b), the plurality
switched from trying to give effect to every word of the statute to placing
significant reliance on the legislative history of section 18(h). 75 An early
version of section 18(h) would have delayed for up to two years the re-
quired coordination with the Department of Labor for a state to retain
transitional control even of regulations more stringent than the federal
standards.76 Justice O'Connor noted that the original version of section
18(h), while not adopted, illustrated Congress' intent to preclude "any
state regulation of an occupational safety or health issue with respect to
which a Federal standard has been established" absent federal
70. See Killian, 918 F.2d at 685 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
71. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2381-86.
72. Id. at 2384. Section 18(a) of the OSH Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting.
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with re-
spect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
73. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2384. Section 18(c) of the Act lists the criteria for a satisfactory
state plan. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1988 & Supp. 1991). Generally, the plan must identify an
agency to administer the program, provide mechanisms for inspection of workplaces and
enforcement of the plan, promise adequate funding for the program, provide assurances
that the plan will apply to all covered employees, and require that employers submit regu-
lar reports to the Secretary of Labor. Id. In particular, the plan must include standards at
least as demanding as the federal standard the state seeks to replace. Id.
74. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2384. When the Secretary of Labor withdraws approval, the
state plan "cease[s] to be in effect" and the state may retain jurisdiction only over cases
that arose before withdrawal of federal approval and do not relate to the reasons for the
withdrawal. 29 U.S.C. § 667(0.
75. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2384-85. Section 18(h) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988 &
Supp. 1991). See infra note 123 (text of Section 18(h)).
76. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2385. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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approval.77
In sum, the plurality concluded that section 18 establishes uniform fed-
eral control and simultaneously provides states the option to supplant
federal regulations with approved state plans. Justice O'Connor refused
to hold that the OSH Act expressly preempted state regulation of occu-
pational safety and health; rather, the plurality merely concluded Con-
gress had erected a pervasive federal scheme.78 Justice O'Connor refused
to label her finding "express preemption" and instead proceeded through
the OSH Act section by section to find implied preemption of the chal-
lenged Illinois laws.7 9
2. Implied Preemption Analysis
Despite concluding that the OSH Act preempts state laws expressly,
the plurality addressed the potential conflict between federal standards
under the OSH Act and the challenged Illinois law. That analysis
amounted to an examination of the OSH Act under implied preemption
principles. The plurality noted that goals common to both federal and
state laws will not automatically render the state law in conflict with fed-
eral law.8" Rather, the conflict must be threatening to federal policy to
justify finding implied preemption. The plurality did not identify a pre-
cise conflict that would trigger preemption of the Illinois laws by the
OSH Act, but asserted that states must take the approved-plan route be-
cause the Act designates that method to further Congress' goal of pro-
77. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2385.
78. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result in Gade that federal law preempts the
Illinois law, but he reached that conclusion using an express preemption rationale. Id. at
2388-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Unable to find the conflict suggested by the plurality
between the state laws and Congress' intent to have a single set of federal regulations,
Justice Kennedy relied on the statutory language of section 18(b) to find express preemp-
tion, though he admitted that the text lacked an explicit statement of preemption. Id. at
2390. Instead, Justice Kennedy rationalized that "Congress' intent must be divined from
the language, structure, and purposes of the statute as a whole." Id. Adopting the plural-
ity's analysis of section 18, Justice Kennedy concluded that standing alone, section 18 indi-
cated that if a state did not have an approved plan, then it could not enforce job safety and
health standards in areas covered by federal standards. Id. at 2390-91. Justice Kennedy
further agreed with the plurality on the scope of the OSH Act's preemption power and the
irrelevancy of state objectives other than workplace safety as motives for state legislation.
Id. at 2391.
79. Gade, 112 S. Ct. 2385-88.
80. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386; see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 494 (1987) (preemption of state laws having same goals as or interfering with federal
statutes).
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moting worker safety.8 The plurality concluded that on its face "the
OSH Act pre-empts all state 'occupational safety and health standards
relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated."' 2
Given that conclusion, the plurality faced the issue of section 18(b)'s
effect on "dual impact" laws. Specifically, Justice O'Connor asked
whether the challenged Illinois statutes sought to promote exclusively oc-
cupational safety and health or whether the statutes legitimately sought
to protect public health and the environment, the laws' stated purposes.
83
In essence, the Court had to decide whether to accept the purposes ar-
ticulated on the face of the laws. The plurality emphasized the relevance
of not only the laws' stated purposes but also the impact on the occupa-
tional health and safety field.'
The Supreme Court disregarded the purposes of the Illinois laws apart
from job safety. The legislative history of the Illinois licensing statutes is,
not surprisingly, mixed. Although none of the three Supreme Court
opinions examined the legislative history of the state measures, some of
that history accords with the Court's conclusion that, the Illinois laws in-
tended to target solely job safety. Concededly, one of the stated pur-
poses, to "promote job safety," 85 duplicates the OSH Act's purpose. 6
However, the long titles of both of the licensing statutes proclaim them to
be laws "in relation to environmental protection."87 In fact, the Illinois
laws are narrower in scope than the OSH Act in that they do not apply to
two significant hazardous waste situations: voluntary clean-up sites and
81. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386; see also Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494.
82. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386 (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 667).
83. Id. at 2386-88.
84. Id. at 2387. Thus, one may phrase the inquiry as whether the state law acts more
as a job safety measure or as a public safety or environmental measure. Cf English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990) (California nuclear safety law's "actual effect"
examined in preemption analysis); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (pur-
poses of state laws are not revealed in the legislature's description and the practical impact
is what the court determines).
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, paras. 220(2) & 221(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993). Both statutes
seek to "promote job safety and protect life, limb and property." Id.
86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Congressional debate concerning OSHA
acknowledged that federal legislation normally does not supersede state law when the state
law is superior to the federal provisions. 116 CONG. REC. 38, 385 (November 23, 1970)
(statement of Rep. Dent). Furthermore, the Senate Committee Report indicated that the
OSH Act's requirements were intended to be minimum requirements. S. REP. No. 1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5182.
87. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 225, paras. 220(1) & 221(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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emergency response sites.88 Additionally, Illinois did not intend the laws
to regulate all of the same classes of workers that the OSH Act does. 89
Also, the statutes do not extend coverage to any sites or workers not
already covered by the OSH Act.
Illinois tailored the laws narrowly, presumably to address specific
problems within the state that were not addressed adequately under ex-
isting federal standards. Had the legislature attempted to augment all of
the federal standards for workers in the hazardous materials industry, the
result would have appeared more as legislation driven by special inter-
ests, rather than a measure addressing a state problem.9" On the other
hand, the licensing provisions were enacted on the heels of another bill
designed to raise revenue for state and local hazardous waste disposal
funds.9' Political reality being what it is, it would be facile to impute a
single motive to the Illinois legislature in enacting the licensing
provisions.
One sponsor of the Illinois laws identified "one of the major reasons
for [the bill was] that we have now several sites being cleaned up in the
state where out-of-state personnel are coming in" with unknown qualifi-
cations. 92 But those concerns do not support the state's argument for
concurrent state and federal standards because the federal standard for
licensing toxic waste workers directly addresses that issue. Federal stan-
dards qualifying workers who handle hazardous materials dispense com-
pletely with any need for state action. Given the apparent lack of need
for state-specific regulations, the Supreme Court reasonably looked be-
yond the stated purposes of the challenged laws toward the measures'
actual impact.
After analyzing the Illinois statutes' stated purposes, Justice O'Connor
considered the second prong of the implied preemption analysis, the ac-
tual impact of the licensing provisions. As Justice O'Connor noted, this
prong was less susceptible to clear resolution because the Illinois laws had
88. Id. paras. 220(3)(f) & 221(3)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
89. Id. paras. 220(4)(c)-(f) and 221(4)(b)-(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
90. STATE OF ILLINOIS 85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TRANSCRIPTION OF DEBATE 127th Legislative Day 55 (July 1, 1988). Illinois Representa-
tive Breslin noted in debate on the bill that the legislature had passed a measure the year
before which allowed municipalities to create their own programs for collection of hazard-
ous wastes from households. Id. at 57. He identified the concern generated by having
untrained people handle toxic waste and the need for state action. Id.
91. Id.
92. STATE OF ILLINOIS 85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SENATE TRANSCRIPTION OF DE-
BATE 127th Legislative Day 62 (July 1, 1988) (remarks of Senator Welch).
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not gone into effect when NSWMA sued to enjoin their enforcement.93
The plurality opinion pointed out that under the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),94 certification requirements
for workers who seek to engage in hazardous material operations consti-
tute occupational health and safety standards.95 Concluding "[tihat such
a [state] law may also have a nonoccupational impact does not render it
any less an occupational standard for purposes of preemption analysis,"
the plurality doomed Illinois' entire licensing scheme to death by federal
preemption, although a majority of the Supreme Court was unwilling to
do so outright.96
B. The Plurality's Exception to Its Own Rule is Likely Unworkable.
Though the plurality dismissed Illinois' argument that the state laws
constituted "dual impact" measures not subject to preemption, Justice
O'Connor's opinion did not claim to require federal approval of all state
action regulating areas covered by federal standards. Rather, the plural-
ity's opinion indicated that states may still have some room to act. Only
laws not part of a federally approved plan that "directly, substantially,
and specifically" regulate worker health and safety must fail. 7 The Court
distinguished such laws from those of "general applicability" that the
OSH Act would not preempt, even if the state measures had a direct,
clear, and substantial connection to occupational health and safety.98 The
Court described generally applicable laws as those which apply to work-
ers "simply as members of the general public."99
The plurality's "generally applicable" standard is deficient in two re-
spects, both largely ignored in the Court's legal analysis. First, the stan-
dard is difficult to apply because all workers are members of the general
public. Illinois certainly intended to protect hazardous waste workers
93. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386-88.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1991).
95. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2388.
96. Id. A majority of the justices affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit which effectively remanded the case for findings of fact on the impact of
the laws: "Like the Court of Appeals, we do not specifically consider which of the licens-
ing acts' provisions will stand or fall under the preemption analysis set forth above." Id.




99. Justice O'Connor pointed to traffic and fire safety laws as examples of generally
applicable laws. Id. at 2387.
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while on the job."° However, the long-term implications of toxic waste
improperly disposed also affect the workers, their families, and their
neighbors as members of the public. Addressing a public health threat as
serious as hazardous materials, the state law targets every state citizen.
One could argue that regulations like those challenged in Gade regulate
workers merely because they are the first line of society's defense.'' The
Illinois laws in question set high standards for worker training to protect
the public and the environment as much as the workers. All of the opin-
ions in Gade ignore the specific factual circumstances of the case - the
local exigencies involved in disposing of toxic wastes. The result is a rule
that irresponsibly fails to allow a state to require stringent training for
hazardous material handlers absent federal approval.
The second problem with the Gade plurality's "generally applicable"
standard is that the statutes challenged in Gade appear to satisfy the stan-
dard, yet the Court declined, without explanation, to apply the standard
to the facts of the case. Illinois' laws applied to hazardous waste workers,
at least in part, as members of the general public. Only by ignoring the
Illinois laws' stated goals of protecting "life, limb, and property" did the
Court reject the Illinois laws.'" 2 In doing so, the Court sends mixed sig-
nals about the proper application of the standard. On one hand, the
Court finds that the OSH Act preempts state law only if the state meas-
ures relate exclusively to job safety. But on the other hand, the Court's
example in Gade indicates that courts should carefully scrutinize state
laws but may freely disregard the laws' stated purposes. Thus, Gade
raises doubts as to whether any state law can meet the standard of the
Court's "generally applicable" exception.
III. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENTING OPINION: PARALLEL ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 18 LEADS TO OPPOSITE CONCLUSION
The dissent10 3 argued simply that the text of the OSH Act failed' to
support the plurality's conclusion that Congress intended section 18 to
preempt "state regulation of any occupational safety or health issue as to
which there is a federal standard, whether or not the state regulation con-
100. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 225, paras. 220(2) and 221(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
101. States could possibly draft laws to circumvent preemption as follows: "no one
shall handle toxic wastes without becoming licensed ...." Drafted this way, the law argua-
bly applies to all people equally.
102. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
103. Id. at 2391-95 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Thomas, dissented.
1994] Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n
flicts with the federal standard. ''"" 4 The plurality analyzed the Gade facts
under principles of preemption where state law impedes the accomplish-
ment of the "full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 5 By examining
exactly the same subsections of the OSH Act's section 18 as did the plu-
rality, Justice Souter thoughtfully demonstrated an alternative interpreta-
tion of section 18 which led him to conclude that all state law is not
necessarily preempted in areas where federal standards exist."0 6 The dis-
sent argued that since preemption principles did not apply to cases such
as Gade, courts should analyze similar section 18(b) cases according to
principles of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 107
104. Id. at 2391-92.
105. Id. at 2392 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
106. Id. at 2395 ("A purely permissive provision for enforcement of state regulations
does not imply that all state regulations are otherwise unenforceable.").
107. Id. at 2394. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is based on the idea that states
may not unduly burden interstate commerce even in the absence of federal action because
Congress has explicit power over interstate commerce. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce power of Congress is plenary and
covers anything affecting commercial intercourse. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 211. Generally,
courts invalidate state statutes that either burden or discriminate against interstate com-
merce. A balancing test is applied to potentially burdensome statutes; the law will be al-
lowed to stand if its burden on interstate commerce is not clearly excessive relative to
putative local benefits. See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974)
(holding unconstitutional a Mississippi law which barred an out-of-state cotton buyer from
enforcing its purchase contracts with Mississippi cotton growers in the state's courts); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that Arizona could not require in-state
packing of fruit grown in Arizona that was to be shipped out of the state). Significantly,
the balancing test allows some flexibility if the state law implicates safety interests and the
total effect of the law as a safety measure is not slight. Cf Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (holding unconstitutional an Iowa statute limiting
trucks to 55 feet in length in the state for lack of evidence of promoting safety and refusing
to engage in balancing of safety interests).
To determine whether a state impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce,
courts simply find that laws treating in-state interests differently from out-of-state interests
are per se invalid. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (forbidding
New Jersey to ban importation of waste into its landfills). Laws which are not protectionist
may also be held invalid if they discriminate either on their face or in their practical effect.
To survive the Court's "strictest scrutiny," the state must structure its laws to serve legiti-
mate local purposes only and the court must find that no less discriminatory alternatives
exist. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 150 (1986) (upholding state law prohibiting im-
portation of baitfish); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
354 (1977) (acknowledging that the state law articulated a legitimate local purpose, but
striking down the law because a reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternative method of
reaching the state's goals existed); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951) (because inspection was a nondiscriminatory method of assuring milk quality, the
city could not require all milk sold in the area to be packaged in cardboard containers).
The burden rests on the state to justify its need for the discriminatory law. Hunt, 432 U.S.
at 353.
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Countering the majority's conclusion that Section 18 preempted the Il-
linois licensing acts, the dissent duplicated the plurality's inspection of
sections 18(a), (b), (f), and (h) and reached the opposite conclusion.3
The dissent argued that the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's con-
currence included the preconceived notion that the state laws were pre-
empted and drew conclusions about the statutory language which were
not necessarily the only possible conclusions.' 09 By raising a specter of
doubt about the analysis employed by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
the dissent effectively undermined the certainty of the rule expressed by a
majority of Justices.
First Justice Souter dealt with the express preemption argument. The
dissent relied on Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission" for the proposition that ex-
press preemption requires an explicit provision of preemption."' Noting
the absence of "explicit pre-emptive language" in OSHA, Justice Souter
discarded Justice Kennedy's finding of express preemption."
2
The dissent's approach differs from those of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy in that it seems to begin with the presumption that "Congress
did not intend to displace state law." 113 The dissent argued that the
Court should find preemption of state law only where congressional in-
tent to preempt is unmistakable." 4 Applying that stricter standard, the
dissent looked to section 18 of the OSH Act for a rational interpretation
that did not necessitate preemption of state law.
A. Sections 18(a) and 18(b) Analysis
The plurality drew on section 18(a) of the OSH Act to support its con-
clusion that the Act preempts state law because, it claimed, that without
prescribing preemption, section 18(a)'s permissive language allowing
The basic difference between preemption and dormant Commerce Clause analysis is
that preemption looks to what Congress has already enacted for guidance, while dormant
Commerce Clause analysis examines what state law has done and, as long as the state has
not violated the Commerce Clause, leaves the matter to Congress to address by enacting a
specific federal law.
108. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2391-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2393-95.
110. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
111. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2392.
112. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203; see Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (Souter, J., dissenting);
cf Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2390 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding the language of the OSH Act
sufficient to expressly preempt state laws).
113. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
114. Id.; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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states to enforce standards in the absence of federal standards would be
meaningless. 1 - In contrast, Justice Souter argued that section 18(a) im-
plied only that some federal regulations might preempt some state
laws." 6 The dissent found that the text of section 18(a) would permit
federal and state standards to coexist if "compliance with both ... is not
physically impossible.""' 7 Furthermore, Justice Souter interpreted sec-
tion 18(a) to allow Congress discretion to enact field preemption." 8
Thus, according to the dissent's reading, section 18(a) declares that the
OSH Act should preempt state law only if federal and state laws conflict
in practice.
The dissent pointed out that section 18(b) on its face does not provide
for automatic preemption of unapproved state programs by federal stan-
dards." 9 Rather, the dissent found that section 18(b), like section 18(a),
lacks any language that expressly prohibits concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction. 2 ' The dissent reasoned that because the OSH Act does not
require states to assume responsibility for hazardous waste regulation,
Congress provided the mechanism for state plan approval in section 18(b)
only for use by states choosing to accept the federal enforcement role,
which entails a complete transfer of jurisdiction over occupational health
and safety from the state to the federal level. 2 '
Justice Souter pointed out that the Secretary of Labor's authority to
approve state plans is limited by the Secretary's judgment that a plan
does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 22 The plurality concluded
that preemption would prevent states from enforcing standards which did
violate that standard. However, the dissent suggested that dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis rather than preemption analysis is available for
those situations, should they ever arise.
123
115. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2384 ("[I]f a state were free to enact conflicting safety and
health regulations then § 18(a) would be superfluous.").
116. Id. at 2393 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. Field preemption describes those situations in which Congress' laws "occupy
the field" to such an extent as to permit the inference that Congress intended to rule out
any state regulation in the same areas.
119. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2394. Section 18(b) is set forth supra note 13.
120. Gade, 112 S. Ct. 2393-94 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2394 ("[I]n actually providing a mechanism for a State to 'assume responsi-
bility' for an issue with respect to which a federal standard has been promulgated ...
§ 18(b) is far from preemptive of anything adopted by the States.").
122. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (1988).
123. See supra note 106 for a discussion of dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
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B. Sections 18(f) and 18(h) Analysis
124
The dissent attacked the plurality's assertion that section 18(f)'s refer-
ence to withdrawal of approval for a state plan amounted to a complete
reversion to federal guidelines. 2 ' According to the dissent, section 18(f)
provides only for the loss of state enforcement authority with respect to a
plan for which federal approval has been withdrawn. The dissent con-
cluded that the OSH Act's section 18(f) does not address how a state with
an approved plan should treat enforcement of state measures not in-
cluded in that plan. 26 In essence, the Gade issues boil down to whether a
state law not under the aegis of a federally approved plan can coexist with
federal OSHA standards. If the dissent's interpretation of section 18 is
correct, then section 18(f) would have the limited effect of invalidating an
unapproved state plan; it would not affect any state law beyond the scope
of the plan from which federal approval was withdrawn. As the dissent
points out, such a result is consistent with the statutory language. 27
Justice Souter completed his attack on the plurality's statutory con-
struction of section 18 by noting that section 18(h) supports more than
one implication of congressional intent. 28 The dissent faulted the plural-
ity for claiming that its interpretation was the only appropriate one.' 29
Section 18(h) allowed for continued enforcement of state regulations for
up to two years after federal standards had been promulgated. °
Although section 18(h)'s effective period has expired, the provision does
indicate something about Congress' scheme. The plurality had contended
that allowing for continued state jurisdiction during the transition from
state to federal regulation implied that states would be prohibited from
enforcing any regulation of their own in areas where federal standards
had been passed. 3' Emphasizing the temporary and transitional nature
of section 18(h), the dissent argued that for a limited time, states could
124. Section 18(h) provides:
The Secretary may enter into an agreement with a State under which the State
will be permitted to continue to enforce one or more occupational health and
safety standards in effect in such State until final action is taken by the Secretary
with respect to a plan submitted by a State under subsection (b) of this section, or
two years from December 29, 1970, whichever is earlier.
29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
125. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2395 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2395.
128. Id. at 2394-95.
129. Id. at 2395.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
131. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
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have continued enforcing their own regulations (unless they conflicted
with federal standards), while awaiting federal approval of their plans.132
In short, the dissent interpreted the statute as providing for a single tran-
sition from state law in existence at the time of the OSH Act's passage to
state law embodied in a federally sanctioned plan.' 33 Such a construction
of section 18(f) is persuasive in its inherent logic and practicality. If Con-
gress intended to apply only one set of standards to areas of job health
and safety, as the plurality contended,' 34 Justice Souter's interpretation of
section 18(f) provides the more efficient means to that end.
Unwilling to find in section 18 of the OSH Act a congressional intent to
preempt all state law in areas where federal standards exist, the dissent
would have considered further the Illinois laws to determine if compli-
ance with both federal and state standards was possible. If coexistence
was possible, the dissent would uphold the Illinois licensing statutes. 35
The dissent did not approve of courts resolving situations like Gade by
applying the harsh preemption analysis advocated by the majority. As
long as the state enacted regulations consistent with federal enforcement
efforts, Justice Souter would leave opponents of the state laws to resort to
trying to change the law through the legislative process.'36
IV. GADE IN LEGAL AND PRACTICAL Focus
In the analysis of any Supreme Court decision, the importance of pub-
lic policy issues generally equals, if not outweighs, the significance of the
legal analysis employed by the Court. When reviewing Gade one must
remember that the Court invalidated the Illinois hazardous waste licens-
ing regulations on the ground that the laws constituted exclusively job
safety measures. The Court effectively disregarded the fact that such
laws might have measurably improved the safety of disposal of toxic
wastes to the benefit of the public and the environment.' 37
The result in Gade is that the federal OSHA standards preempted the
licensing regulations Illinois enacted in 1988. Thus, the Illinois hazardous
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2383.
135. Id. at 2395.
136. Such a result would be judiciously economical because the courts would have to
determine only whether an actual conflict existed between federal and state standards or
whether the state regulation unduly burdened interstate commerce.
137. The Court has allowed states to impose other laws on employers that cost more
money than the federal standard would, for example, in the context of minimum wages
paid to employees.
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waste operators will not be required to finance additional training and
certification of its workers. Because the Illinois laws did not actually go
into effect, the cost of hazardous waste operations should not change as
significantly as they might have if employers had been forced to take
their increased costs of training and documentation into setting prices for
their services. While the availability of toxic waste services at reasonable
costs is important to society, the Gade outcome raises the question: at
what other expense do we make that choice?
The majority and dissent in Gade present two different paths for future
resolution of federal preemption of state law under OSHA: one adminis-
trative and one litigious. A majority of the Court chose to require states
to pursue administrative approval of desired regulation. But securing
federal approval of state hazardous waste plans requires a significant
amount of time.138 Therefore, if states cannot act in any area in which a
federal standard exists until such action becomes part of an approved
plan, a lag time between the development of better methods of dealing
with toxic materials and the implementation of those methods will always
exist. In effect, the Court, subject to a very limited "generally applicable"
exception, has designated the Secretary of Labor as the gatekeeper for
technological advancements in the field of toxic waste disposal. Delay
might not be terribly harmful in some industries; however, hazardous
waste materials pose such serious public health risks that the majority's
resolution of Gade is not entirely satisfactory from a public health
perspective.
The result of the case under the dissent's analysis is not vastly superior
in a public health context because it only substitutes the lengthy process
of litigation for administrative approval. Legislation of the type passed
by Illinois will usually be challenged by those most likely to incur the
costs of its implementation. The dissent in Gade would leave factual de-
terminations (such as whether actual conflict exists between federal and
state regulation or whether state law imposes an unjustified burden on
interstate commerce) to the courts. The financial costs and delay associ-
ated with litigation may in many cases even exceed the burden of waiting
for the federal administrative approval imposed by the majority.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gade also confuses traditional preemp-
tion analysis. Although she found that the text of the OSH Act sup-
138. As the dissent read § 18(f) of the OSH Act, which was passed in 1970, that time
was thought to be up to two years. See NOTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 68-69 (describing final
stages of approval process and associated time intervals).
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ported express preemption of state regulation, she did not label her
conclusion clearly and proceeded to analyze the facts under an implied
preemption theory. Implied preemption analysis is not necessary to
reach the holding in the case but its presence in the opinion calls into
question precedents on preemption.
For example, in Associated Industries v. Snow, the court of appeals vali-
dated state regulations on the grounds that they were intended to protect
asbestos workers.'39 Were it to follow Gade, a majority of the Supreme
Court might reject the stated purpose of the state laws and decide that all
of the challenged Massachusetts regulations were preempted by the OSH
Act.' 4 ° However, since the Court in Gade failed to articulate how prof-
fered justifications for state laws were to be distinguished, state
lawmakers are left wondering whether the purposes they write into the
laws will be respected by the courts.
In another case, a different court of appeals upheld regulations that it
found did not conflict with OSHA standards because they served a pur-
pose other than protecting workers. Here again, Gade reflects a more
skeptical perspective on conflict and suggests that failure to find preemp-
tion of the city's laws puts the Second Circuit in error."'
Finally, the Supreme Court's own decision in Guerra'42 found that the
Pregnancy Disability Act did not preempt a California law because the
Court believed that preemption was only appropriate where the state law
required unlawful conduct under the federal statute. Such logic would
suggest that the Illinois statutes challenged in Gade could stand, since
they were consistent with the OSH Act's goal of protecting worker safety
and did not call for any illegal acts. The fact that the Court decided Gade
differently indicates that the current Court more readily will favor pre-
emption of state laws by federal statutes than the Court did in Guerra. In
this way, Gade represents a significant increase in the Court's willingness
to preempt state law in the absence of clear statutory language indicating
Congress' intent to displace state law. That approach directly contradicts
the Court's presumption in Guerra that "pre-emption is not to be lightly
presumed." '43 Under the Gade approach, Guerra might well turn out
139. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
140. The Court disapproved of Associated Industries in Gade. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2382
n.1.
141. See surpa notes 55-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Environmental
Encapsulating. Justice O'Connor disapproved of the result in Environmental Encapsu-
lating by implication. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2381.
142. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
143. Gade, 112 S. Ct at 2381 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981)); cf
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differently. The problem is that Gade disrupts preemption analysis and
does not offer certainty under its "generally applicable" standard.
V. CONCLUSION
If permitted to coexist with the OSH Act, Illinois' licensing laws would
clearly have resulted in increased costs to employers engaged in hazard-
ous waste operations.144 More speculatively, employers might have tried
to reduce the costs imposed by the laws by training fewer employees,
which in turn would have produced fewer licensed workers to cope with
the serious public health risk of hazardous waste disposal. 4 , The almost
certain result would have been a more highly skilled group of workers
handling toxic waste and improvements in waste management due to an-
nual updating of state training programs. 46 Therefore, the Supreme
Court's invalidating of the Illinois laws may negatively impact implemen-
tation of emerging technology in the toxic waste industry because any
new standard must gain federal approval before being used.
In conclusion, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n repre-
sents a difficult resolution of legal principles and public health concerns.
It would be costly to society to allow a state like Illinois to require ex-
traordinary training and testing of its employees because few employers
could stay in business under such circumstances. Logically, fewer quali-
fied employees would be able to clean up proportionally less waste than a
greater number of less-qualified workers. Thus, hazardous waste opera-
tions might be disposed of more effectively, but more toxic materials
might never be handled at all.
On the other side, why should a state not be allowed to supplement
federal guidelines without assuming total responsibility for worker health
and safety? Laws not beneficial to society could simply be repealed
Justice Souter's dissent in Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2392 (noting that when Congress explicitly
states its laws "alone are to regulate a part of commerce," no analysis is necessary because
"state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall.").
144. Costs associated with the regulations no doubt partly motivated NSWMA to chal-
lenge the laws. But see generally Ann P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Predation Through
Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
Environmental Protection Act, 30 J.L. & ECON. 239 (1987).
145. See generally Ann P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Reg-
ulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1985).
146. The district court accepted the proposition that the state law would improve the
industry. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, No. 88 C 10732, 1989 WL
96438 at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1989) ("It is a truism that expertise follows experience. And
4,000 hours of experience represents a sizable step on the road to expertise.").
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through the same legislative process that brought the laws into being.
Then states could more quickly implement changes in response to devel-
oped technology or react to specific problems within the state.
The fact remains that Gade's rule is that states may under practically
no circumstances implement regulations that supplement the federal
standards under the OSH Act. If a state were to do so, the rule in Gade
requires preemption of state standards under the authority of section
18(b) of the OSH Act. Only time will tell exactly how narrowly the "gen-
erally applicable" standard will be interpreted by lower courts and
whether the Supreme Court will continue to use the doctrine of preemp-
tion to trample states' attempts to regulate job safety and health.
Jane M. Lyons

